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Abstract
Are productivity estimates good proxies for unobserved management? And, does management affect production in a neutral
and monotonic fashion as assumed by these proxies? We use Bloom and Van Reenen’s management data to show that two
popular proxies, fixed effects and inefficiency scores, correlate with observed management practices. We find that the
correlations are positive but weak. Also, management explains only a fraction of the proxies’ variances. The data rejects the
assumptions of neutrality and monotonicity. Last, our results suggest that management has characteristics both of a
technology and an input.
Keywords Management practice ● production functions ● stochastic frontier analysis ● semiparametric models
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1 Introduction
Economists often use productivity estimates as proxies for
unobserved management, either to control for omitted
variable bias or to measure management at the firm level.
For instance, Nickell (1996) estimates the effect of
competition on firm productivity and assumes that pro-
ductivity estimates serve as proxies for management
quality, among other things. As management is usually
unobserved, the correlation between management and pro-
ductivity estimates1 is assumed. Using the management
data produced by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007)
we are able to test this assumption empirically. We ask
whether two popular productivity estimates, firm fixed
effects and inefficiency scores, correlate with observed
management practices. Also, we ask whether the assump-
tions underlying their use, neutrality and monotonicity, are
valid.
The use of inefficiency estimates as proxies for man-
agement goes back at least to Farrell (1957). His model
treats the production function as a best-practice frontier and
the difference between actual production and best practice
as inefficiency. For given inputs and outputs he attributes
estimates of technical inefficiency to bad management (p.
261):
[…] the technical efficiency of a firm or plant
indicates the undisputed gain that can be achieved
by simply ‘gingering up’ the management […].
Farrell’s model sets management apart from the con-
ventional inputs of capital and labor in the sense that inef-
ficiency indicates the potential for management to increase
output for given conventional inputs, implying that man-
agement is a technology. Put differently, unlike conven-
tional inputs, management alone cannot produce. Nuthall
(2009, p. 413) expresses this as follows: “… the key factor
in the management of land, labor and capital is the man-
agement ability applied.” On the other hand, Mundlak
(1961)’s concern is about omitted variable bias when the
management input is unobserved. His model uses firm fixed
effects as proxies for management. The model requires
panel data and the assumption that management is time-
invariant. We empirically test whether the two proxies,
inefficiency and fixed effects, correlate with observed
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1 A complication in testing the relation between management and
productivity is that the latter is unobserved, too. Productivity is usually
estimated from observed input and output quantities.
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management. Both proxies assume that management is a
productivity shifter and that better management always
increases productivity. Put differently, management affects
productivity neutrally and the relation between management
and productivity is monotonic. Together these assumptions
suggest that management is a technology rather than an
input.2 To empirically test these two assumptions we apply
semiparametric technology models where the influence of
management can be non-neutral as well as non-monotonic.
A semiparametric model is more general than the para-
metric linear model Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) use to
correlate management with total factor productivity. Their
model takes a log-linearized Cobb-Douglas form with
management z added in an ad hoc fashion: Inyi= α0+ z′α
+ Inx′β. They find that management positively correlates
with total factor productivity (TFP), α is statistically sig-
nificant. The parametric linear model helps them validate
their survey measure but our investigation of the goodness
of productivity as a proxy for management requires a more
flexible model. For instance, the use of TFP as a proxy for
management requires that TFP increases in management
everywhere and not just at the mean. Also, with the para-
metric linear model, whether management z is a technology
depends on the interpretation of the estimated coefficient α.
Inconsistent with the management as technology inter-
pretation, management alone can produce positive output.
The semiparametric models we apply (Robinson 1988; Li
et al. 2002) make the technology explicitly management
specific: f z (x), i.e., the production function parameters vary
with management. Semiparametric models strike a balance
between a standard parametric structure for the conven-
tional inputs and a nonparametric structure for management.
The nonparametric part makes the model fully flexible in
regard to the effect of management on production and
thereby accommodates our theoretical ignorance about how
management affects the technology. As the model does not
impose the assumptions of neutrality and monotonicity we
can test them. Finally, the model allows us to express
characteristics of the production function like returns to
scale as functions of management.
We find that the correlation between fixed effects or
inefficiency scores and management is positive but weak:
the largest correlation coefficient is 0.35. Also, we find that
management explains at most 5% of the variance in the
proxies. Firms and policy makers use productivity or inef-
ficiency estimates to assess potential performance
improvements through better management. The scope for
such improvements might be much lower than suggested by
the face values of the proxies. Despite the effect of man-
agement on productivity not being strictly neutral, the
neutral component gives a relationship between total factor
productivity and management that is mostly increasing.
Thus, productivity estimates are suitable for ranking firms
on management practices but not for quantifying unob-
served management practices.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the empirical models that we apply. Section 3 introduces the
data. Section 4 gives the results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical models
First, we introduce two popular productivity estimates that
are also used as proxies for unobserved management.
Generally, when management is unobserved it is approxi-
mated by A, a neutral shift variable outside the production
function f(·):
y¼Af xð Þ; ð1Þ
where y is output and x is conventional input, e.g., capital
and labor. We omit firm and time indices where they are not
necessary. In this model, management is a neutral
technology-shifter and more management is always better.
Neutrality implies, that management is fully separable from
the conventional inputs. It does not interact with them, no
matter what functional form we choose for f(·). Separability
allows us to estimate management when it is unobserved.
There are different ways to obtain A. One way is to capture
A with firm fixed effects as in Mundlak (1961). We replace
A with firm fixed effects αi and append a classical error term
v to obtain a standard fixed effects model:
yit¼αiþf xitð Þþvit; ð2Þ
where i identifies firms and t identifies time. Estimation
requires panel data. The fixed effects are proxies for
management to the extent that management is time-
invariant. They also capture all other unobserved, time-
invariant factors. In an alternative model, A represents
production inefficiency (a random variable). If A is both
firm- and year-specific, we can write it as
Ait¼A0 AitA0  A0e
uit ; uit  0; ð3Þ
where
A0  max
i;t
Aitf g; AitA0  e
uit  1: ð4Þ
Note that this model can also be estimated in a cross-
section. Plugging (3) into (1), taking logarithms, and
appending a classical error term v, we obtain the standard
2 It is conceivable that management is also a conventional input, i.e., a
choice variable. Bloom et al. (2012) refer to these alternatives as
“management as a technology” and “management as a factor”,
respectively. They test these alternatives and their empirical results
support the theory that management is a technology. But they find that
management has some features of a conventional input as well.
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stochastic frontier (SF) production model (Aigner et al.
1977; Meeusen and van den Broeck 1977), viz.,
ln yit¼α0þ ln f xitð Þþvit  uit; ð5Þ
where
α0¼ lnA0: ð6Þ
The interpretation of this model is that ln yit ¼ α0 þ
ln f xitð Þ þ vit is the best-practice stochastic frontier tech-
nology and inefficiency is the difference ln yit  ln yit.
Only fully efficient firms operate on the frontier. An
inefficient firm produces 100 ðexpðuitÞ  1Þ percent less
output compared to an efficient firm using the same
amount of inputs. This interpretation assumes that it is
feasible for any firm to improve its management to the
highest level, i.e., attain the best management A0. To
separate the combined error term ε= v−u, we require
assumptions on the distribution of the individual errors.
The standard assumptions are
vit  N 0;σ2v
 
; ð7Þ
uit  Nþ 0;σ2u
 
:
Identification of u is possible when we assume that the
distribution of v is symmetric, e.g., normal, but the dis-
tribution of u is asymmetric, e.g., half-normal (Jondrow
et al. 1982).
As we observe management we can ask whether esti-
mates of fixed effects and inefficiency are good proxies for
management by correlating them with management: we
regress the productivity estimates on management using the
OLS estimator. To better compare inefficiency and fixed
effects we estimate inefficiency to be time-invariant and
adjust for the intercept. Thus, αi from (2) is equivalent to α0
−ui from (5) if u is time-invariant. We control for country
and industry fixed effects by mean transforming the vari-
ables before estimation, i.e., measurement is in terms of
deviations from country-industry means. For the fixed
effects model in (2) and the stochastic frontier model in (5)
the functional form is translog.
Above, we showed that when management is unob-
served, productivity estimates can serve as proxies. As we
observe management we can include it into models of
production in a way that allows us to test the assumptions of
monotonicity and neutrality. First, we extend the stochastic
frontier model to include management directly. One way to
include management in (5) is to relax the mean zero
assumption for u and allow exogenous influences on u using
a truncated normal distribution.3 We make both the mean
and the variance of the inefficiency distribution functions of
management by modifying the assumptions in (7) as
follows:
vit  N 0;σ2v
 
; ð8Þ
uit  Nþðμit;σ2itÞ;
μit ¼ zitδ;
σ2it ¼ exp zitγð Þ;
σ2v ¼ exp zitλð Þ:
From the estimates of this model we can calculate
the marginal effects of management on the mean, ∂u/∂z,
and the variance ∂σ2/∂z of the inefficiency distribution.
The intuition for the variance of u is that it captures
production uncertainty, e.g. better management correlates
with lower production uncertainty. Note that as we
have a single z variable −∂u/∂z= ∂lny/∂z. Wang (2002)
shows that the parametrization in (8) allows the effects
of z to be non-monotonic, i.e., management can increase
or decrease inefficiency. This is useful, because it
allows us to test the monotonicity assumption implied by
the proxies.4
The stochastic frontier model shifts the production
frontier with u, which in turn can be a function of man-
agement if management is observed. A more straightfor-
ward way to shift the production function with
management is to allow management to affect the tech-
nology in a fully flexible way. To represent this flexibility
we write
y ¼ f z xð Þ ð9Þ
where the superscript z indicates that the production
function is different for different values of management.
To motivate this flexible model, we return to (1) and make
A(·) a function of z. We can write the model as
ln yit ¼ lnA zitð Þ þ ln f xitð Þ þ vit ð10Þ
where vit is the noise term. This is the semiparametric
partially linear (PL) model proposed by Robinson (1988)
where A is completely unspecified (nonparametric) but the x
variables are specified as usual in a log-linearized form.
Here x and z are treated differently in the sense that the
functional form for x is parametric but it is nonparametric
for z. Nested in (10) is the standard form ln yi ¼ α0 þ z′αþ
ln x′β where f(·) is Cobb–Douglas and A a linear function of
3 We used the Stata code made available by Hung-Jen Wang on his
web site.
4 The models in (7) and (8) do not separate time-invariant firm het-
erogeneity from inefficiency leading to an overestimate of true inef-
ficiency in most cases. But as in our sample observed management is
largely time-invariant we do not include firm fixed effects in the
inefficiency model.
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z. Li et al. (2002) generalized the PL model and allowed all
parameters to be functions of the z variable:5
ln yit ¼ α zitð Þ þ ln x′β zitð Þ þ vit: ð11Þ
In this semiparametric smooth coefficient (SPSC) model z
affects productivity both neutrally and non-neutrally. The
neutral effect is captured by α(zit) and the non-neutral effects
are captured via the inputs β(zit). We think of these different
effects as channels through which management operates. The
PL model in (10) constrains the effects via the inputs to zero.
Again, equations (10) and (11) are not linear in parameters
since both α and β are nonparametric functions of z, which are
not necessarily linear. The combination of being parametric in
x and nonparametric in z makes the function semiparametric.
Importantly, this difference captures the economic difference
between the conventional inputs of capital and labor and the
non-conventional management input.
Technically, these semiparametric models strike a bal-
ance between precision and robustness (Robinson 1988).
Although fully parametric models are very precise they
suffer from possible functional form mis-specification.
Nonparametric models are robust but inefficient as they
suffer from the curse of dimensionality problem. However,
for SPSC models with a single z variable, like ours, the
curse of dimensionality is not important (Li et al. 2002).
Also, the parametric structure makes the semiparametric
model less sensitive to outliers than the fully nonparametric
model. Appendix A gives details on the estimation of the
SPSC model, including outlier detection, and the con-
struction of bootstrapped confidence intervals. For details
on the estimation of the PL model see Robinson (1988). An
important benefit of the semiparametric models is that they
allow us to test the assumptions of neutrality and mono-
tonicity for the influence of management. We test neutrality
by testing the Null of the PL model, which restricts the
management influence to be neutral, against the SPSC
model, which allows for non-neutral effects. Li and Racine
(2010) propose the test statistic we use. To test the
assumption of monotonicity we visually analyze graphs that
plot management-dependent total factor productivity esti-
mates against management for different models. Finally, by
testing the Null of a parametric linear model including
management against the PL model, using the test by Hsiao
et al. (2007) we can also assess whether the neutral effect of
management is linear or not.
3 Data
In their seminal paper Bloom and Van Reenen (2007)
introduce a survey tool to consistently measure firm-level
management practices across countries and industries. Our
data is from Bloom and Van Reenen (2010).6 The data is for
medium-sized manufacturing firms, for a number of coun-
tries, and for the years 2002 to 2010.7 The number of firm-
year observations is 6349. The panel is highly unbalanced.
The average number of observations by firm is 2.4. The
firms were surveyed on their management practices using a
practice evaluation tool developed in collaboration with a
leading management consulting firm. The tool defines and
scores 18 separate management practices. Each practice was
scored using several questions. The responses were scored
from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). Our management variable is the
unweighted average across the 18 practices; like Bloom and
Van Reenen (2007) we treat it as effectively continuous.
Bloom and Van Reenen (2007, p. 1386) state that their
measure of management practice captures “organizational
capital” rather than employees’ raw ability or skills.
Therefore, the data should capture the quality of manage-
ment not managers. All individual questions and example
responses are listed in Bloom and Van Reenen (2006). The
questions are also reproduced in Appendix B. We only
include privately owned firms. We drop the ownership
categories “government” and “other”. We include the 725
observations that have no value for the ownership variable.
The management data is matched with standard accounting
data at the firm level. Output Y is measured as sales in
current US dollars. Capital input K is tangible fixed assets in
current US dollars and labor input L is number of
employees. Table 1 provides summary statistics for our full
sample. As the semiparametric models are sensitive to
outliers we apply an outlier screen for these models only
(see Appendix A for details).
4 Results
4.1 Do productivity estimates correlate with
observed management?
To investigate whether estimates of fixed effects and inef-
ficiency are good proxies for unobserved management we
regress their estimates against observed management (and a
constant). Figure 1 plots lines of best linear fit including
95% prediction intervals and the raw data. The correlations
5 Although (10) is nested in (11) the estimation strategies are very
different. For details compare Robinson (1988) and Li et al. (2002).
6 The data is available at worldmanagementsurvey.org.
7 The countries are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China,
France, Germany, United Kingdom, Greece, Italy, Japan, Poland,
Portugal, Republic of Ireland, Sweden, and the United States.
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in the two panels have opposite signs, because fixed effects
represent efficiency whereas the stochastic frontier models
estimate inefficiency. The two proxies themselves are
highly correlated. The correlation coefficient between the
estimates of fixed effects and time-invariant inefficiency is
−0.89.
The OLS coefficient estimates for management are 0.34
and −0.18 for fixed effects and inefficiency scores,
respectively. For both regressions the coefficients are sig-
nificant at a 1% level. To compare the magnitudes of the
responses, a one point increase in the management index
(which is roughly two standard deviations) implies an
increase in productivity as measured by fixed effects of
roughly 50% of a standard deviation but only 39% of a
standard deviation for the inefficiency scores. A further test
for the goodness of the proxies is that the residuals from the
second stage regressions should not correlate with man-
agement. At standard levels of statistical significance, this is
true for the fixed effects but not the inefficiency score
residuals. However, there is no economically significant
correlation between management and the residuals for either
proxy.
Despite these positive correlations, management explains
little of the variance in the proxies. The R-squares are 0.057
and 0.035 for the fixed effects and inefficiency models,
respectively. Remember that our hypothesis is that the
proxies are management, implying that the R-squares equal
1. These low R-squares are consistent with the fact that
adding the management variable to a Cobb–Douglas spe-
cification of a conventional production function only
increases R-squared from 0.665 to 0.672 (remember that
our data is transformed around industry and country means).
When comparing fixed effects and inefficiency scores as
proxies for management the former perform better but
require panel data. Absolutely, fixed effects and inefficiency
scores are both poor proxies for management as manage-
ment explains only a small fraction of the proxies’ variation.
This is no surprise as the proxies also capture many other
unobserved factors of production.
4.2 Is the influence of management neutral and
monotonic?
Above we investigated whether productivity estimates
correlate with observed management. In this section, to test
whether total factor productivity is always increasing in
management and whether management affects productivity
neutrally or non-neutrally, we apply production models
where the total factor productivity estimates (or the entire
technology) are functions of management.
To begin, we use a version of the stochastic frontier
model where the mean and the variance of the inefficiency
distribution are functions of management. This model
assumes neutrality but allows us to investigate mono-
tonicity. Figure 2, plots the marginal effects of management
on the mean and variance of the inefficiency distribution
against the level of management. The marginal effects are
negative but increasing, i.e., better management mono-
tonically decreases the mean and variance of the ineffi-
ciency distribution. At the mean the marginal effect on E(u)
is −0.17, similar to the effect for the second stage regres-
sion we found above. This result is evidence that when we
use estimates of u as proxies for unobserved management,
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regressions of fixed effects or time-invariant inefficiency against management and a constant
Table 1 Summary statistics
Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
Sales (US$) 240,047 795,196 7 16,067,543
Capital (US$) 58,203 211,438 2 4,266,051
Labor (#) 869 3016 1 65,682
Management score 3 1 1 5
Observations 6349
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we can be confident that lower inefficiency always corre-
lates with better management. As an aside, better manage-
ment also reduces production uncertainty, i.e., for higher
levels of management there is less variation in inefficiency.
A possible explanation is that better management makes
firms more resilient to changes in their environments.
Next, we use two semiparametric models where man-
agement shifts the technology not via the inefficiency term
but directly via the coefficients. The semiparametric smooth
coefficient (SPSC) model allows all coefficients to be
nonparametric functions of management. The nested PL
model allows only the intercept to be a fully flexible
function of management. In both models the parametric part
has a Cobb–Douglas form. Again, we control for country
and industry fixed effects by mean transforming the vari-
ables before estimation, i.e., measurement is in terms of
deviations from country-industry means.
We use both semiparametric models to further investi-
gate monotonicity. Unlike a linear parametric model the
semiparametric models allow the relation between man-
agement and productivity to be different at every point. We
test the assumption of monotonicity by plotting the intercept
(TFP) estimates from the SPSC and PL models against the
management variable in Fig. 3. The solid line is for the
SPSC model with the dashed lines giving the bootstrapped
95% confidence interval.8 The confidence interval at the
upper end is fairly wide due to a sparsity of observations.
Nevertheless, as SPSC is locally weighted it explains the
data away from the mean better than parametric models.
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SPSC model it adds the 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals
(dashed lines)
8 Appendix A gives details on the bootstrap procedure. We use 100
replications.
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The specification test proposed by Li and Racine (2010)
rejects the Null of the linear parametric model in favor of
the SPSC model (the p-value is zero to the fourth decimal
place9). That is, the coefficients are not constant over z. We
see that TFP is increasing in management everywhere. The
assumption that better management always increases pro-
ductivity seems valid. But what if we restrict management’s
effect to the intercept, as models that use productivity
estimates to measure management do? The dotted line gives
the intercept estimates for the PL model. The line fluctuates,
which is evidence that TFP is not increasing in management
everywhere. However, when testing the Null of a parametric
model where management enters linearly against the PL
model we cannot reject the linear model. The p-value is
0.11. The comparison with the SPSC model’s intercept
suggests that the fluctuations are probably not an artifact of
the data. We believe that the non-monotonic relation
between the PL model’s intercept and management suggests
that the neutral management channel is not fully indepen-
dent of the capital and labor channels (discussed below).
To explore the non-neutral effects of management we
plot the SPSC model’s coefficient estimates for capital and
labor in Fig. 4. The two upper panels give the distributions
for the two coefficients. Assuming competitive input and
output markets these input elasticities reflect revenue shares.
Both distributions are fairly wide and probably multi-
modal. In the lower panels we plot the same coefficients
against management together with their 95% confidence
intervals as well as equivalent linear parametric (OLS)
estimates. We see that firms with low capital and high labor
shares have poor management practices. The opposite is
true for firms with high capital and low labor shares. It
seems is that the optimal management quality depends on
the labor intensity of the firm. Firms with a low labor
intensity might employ skilled workers, which require bet-
ter management practices. Over most of the range of man-
agement the constant parametric coefficient estimate falls
within the SPSC estimates’ confidence intervals. Never-
theless, as already reported above the test of Li and Racine
(2010) rejects the linear parametric model in favor of the
SPSC model. As the parametric model is nested in the
SPSC model this is evidence that the parametric model is
mis-specified (Li et al. 2002, p. 417). A formal test for
neutrality is to apply the same specification test to the Null
of the PL model.10 For our data, the PL model is rejected in
favor of the SPSC model with a p-value zero to the fourth
decimal place. We conclude that management has important
non-neutral effects. Although the question of whether
management is a technology or an input is not the focus of
this paper, our results suggest that it is a bit of both. The fact
that total factor productivity is increasing in management
supports the view that management is akin to a technology.
On the other hand, the finding that management correlates
with capital and labor shares suggests that different types of
firms have different management practices. To the extent
that these differences reflect optimization behavior, man-
agement is an input.
As in the SPSC model all coefficients are functions of
management, we can correlate characteristics of the pro-
duction technology, like returns to scale, with management.
Figure 5 plots estimates of returns to scale based on the
SPSC model, together with their 95% bootstrapped con-
fidence intervals, against management. For comparison, we
also plot the returns to scale estimates from a parametric
model (omitting management). The constant parametric
estimates fall within the SPSC model’s confidence intervals.
However, the point estimates differ between the two mod-
els, especially for firms with poor management practices.
Firms with poor management practices are too small. Above
a certain level of management, scale is optimal for a wide
range of management practices, but it is not clear which
way causality runs.
5 Conclusion
Management is an important, but usually unobserved factor
in production. Theoretically, management is important,
because it is a key mechanism through which owners and
regulators try to influence the performance of firms.
Economists often use total factor productivity estimates
as proxies for management. We take advantage of the
management data produced by Bloom and Van Reenen
(2007) to assess the empirical usefulness of productivity
estimates as proxies for management. First, we correlate
two popular proxies, fixed effects and inefficiency scores,
with observed management. Second, we use flexible models
of production to test whether management influences pro-
ductivity as assumed by the proxies: neutrally and
monotonically.
We find that the correlations between the proxies and
management are positive but weak. Also, observed man-
agement practices explain only a small fraction, no more
than 5%, of the variances of fixed effects and inefficiency
scores. This result is no surprise as fixed effects and inef-
ficiency scores are essentially residuals, which capture all
factors that are time-invariant or follow an asymmetric
distribution, respectively. Overall, fixed effects seem better
management proxies than inefficiency scores but require
panel data. Of course, our analysis assumes that Bloom and
Van Reenen (2007)’s management measure is a good proxy
9 We use a wild cluster bootstrap and 399 replications.
10 We use a wild cluster bootstrap and 399 replications. For the Null
we use the beta coefficients from a OLS regression on the data
transformed as suggested by Robinson (1988).
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Fig. 4 This graph plots the coefficient estimate for capital and labor
from the SPSC model. The upper panels plot the densities of the
coefficient estimates. The lower panels plot the coefficient estimates,
together their 95% confidence intervals and their equivalent parametric
estimates, against management
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itself. There might be dimensions of management quality
omitted by their survey measure.
When measuring management by proxies the correlation
is of interest but so are the assumptions of neutrality and
monotonicity. Testing these assumptions requires models
that do not impose them. To test neutrality, we contrast the
results from two semiparametric models: one that allows
non-neutral effects and another that imposes neutrality. We
find that the effect of management is not strictly neutral.
Besides total factor productivity, management shifts capital
and labor elasticities, too. A formal test also rejects the
neutral model in favor of the non-neutral model. We
investigate monotonicity by plotting management-
dependent total factor productivity estimates from differ-
ent models. Across, these models TFP estimates are mostly
increasing monotonically in management. Last, as man-
agement shifts TFP and correlates with the labor-capital
ratio it seems that management has characteristics of a
technology and an input.
Despite rejecting strict neutrality and also finding some
evidence against monotonicity, we believe that overall our
evidence supports the use of productivity estimates as
proxies for management for some objectives. When the
objective is to rank firms by their management abilities the
use of the proxies is fine. However, the proxies do not
quantify management practices well. For instance, many
regulators base price caps on estimates of inefficiency
(“benchmarking”). The scope for performance improvement
via better management is probably only a fraction of the
face value of inefficiency estimates.
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6 Appendix
6.1 A. Semiparametric estimation
We estimate (11) using a local linear least-squares estimator
proposed by Li et al. 2002 and Li and Racine (2010). For
this we rewrite (11) as
Yi ¼ W ′i γ Zið Þ þ ui; ð12Þ
then pre-multiply by Wi and take expectations conditional
on Zi, which gives
E WiYi Zij½  ¼ E WiW ′i Zij
 
γ Zið Þ þ E Wiui Zij½ : ð13Þ
Under the assumption E WiuijZi½  ¼ 0, we can express γ
(·) as
γðZiÞ ¼ E WiW ′i jZi
  1
E WiYijZi½ : ð14Þ
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Fig. 5 This graph plots returns to scale for the SPSC model against
management including the 95% bootstrapped confidence interval. The
dashed line gives the returns to scale for a fully parametric
Cobb–Douglas model (omitting management)
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This formula can be used to estimate γ(Zi). Li and Racine
(2010) propose the following local constant estimator
bγ zð Þ ¼ Xn
j¼1 WiW
′
i K
Zj  z
h
  	1Xn
j¼1
WiYiK
Zj  z
h
 
ð15Þ
which is a standard least-squares estimator but for the inclusion
of K(·), a diagonal kernel or weighting matrix where the ith
element is Ki=Kh(zi, z) and h is a vector of bandwidths. The
kernel weights the nearby observations. We use a Gaussian
kernel. The intuition is that if K(·) was a Gaussian kernel and z
was a scalar, γ(z) would be a least-squares estimator for z close
to Z. Generally the bandwidth is obtained by minimizing the
squared residuals for the regression curve. We obtain
bandwidths using the fully automated least-squares cross-
validation method where
CV hð Þ ¼ min
h
n1
Xn
i¼1 Yi W
′
ibγi Zð Þ 2M Zið Þ ð16Þ
where bγi zð Þ is the leave-one-out estimator and 0 ≤M
(·) ≤ 1 a weight function.11 This procedure validates the
regression curve by its ability to predict out of sample. This
makes cross-validation sensitive to outliers (Hartarska et al.
2011). Bloom and Van Reenen (2010, footnote 2) stress that
the data we use is noisy. Therefore, we employ the outlier
detection method proposed by Filzmoser et al. (2008) and
remove about 11% of the observations; 5629 observations
Table 2 The management practice dimensions
Categories Score from 1 to 5 based on
1) Introduction of modern manufacturing
techniques
What aspects of manufacturing have been formally introduced, including just-in-time delivery
from suppliers, autonomation, flexible manpower, support systems, attitudes, and behavior?
2) Rationale for introduction of modern
manufacturing techniques
Were modern manufacturing techniques adopted just because others were using them, or are they
linked to meeting business objectives like reducing costs and improving quality?
3) Process problem documentation Are process improvements made only when problems arise, or are they actively sought out for
continuous improvement as part of a normal business process?
4) Performance tracking Is tracking ad hoc and incomplete, or is performance continually tracked and communicated to all
staff?
5) Performance review Is performance reviewed infrequently and only on a success/failure scale, or is performance
reviewed continually with an expectation of continuous improvement?
6) Performance dialog In review/performance conversations, to what extent is the purpose, data, agenda, and follow-up
steps (like coaching) clear to all parties?
7) Consequence management To what extent does failure to achieve agreed objectives carry consequences, which can include
retraining or reassignment to other jobs?
8) Target balance Are the goals exclusively financial, or is there a balance of financial and nonfinancial targets?
9) Target interconnection Are goals based on accounting value, or are they based on shareholder value in a way that works
through business units and ultimately is connected to individual performance expectations?
10) Target time horizon Does top management focus mainly on the short term, or does it visualize short-term targets as a
“staircase” toward the main focus on long-term goals?
11) Targets are stretching Are goals too easy to achieve, especially for some “sacred cows” areas of the firm, or are goals
demanding but attainable for all parts of the firm?
12) Performance clarity Are performance measures ill-defined, poorly understood, and private, or are they well-defined,
clearly communicated, and made public?
13) Managing human capital To what extent are senior managers evaluated and held accountable for attracting, retaining, and
developing talent throughout the organization?
14) Rewarding high performance To what extent are people in the firm rewarded equally irrespective of performance level, or are
rewards related to performance and effort?
15) Removing poor performers Are poor performers rarely removed, or are they retrained and/or moved into different roles or out
of the company as soon as the weakness is identified?
16) Promoting high performers Are people promoted mainly on the basis of tenure, or does the firm actively identify, develop,
and promote its top performers?
17) Attracting human capital Do competitors offer stronger reasons for talented people to join their companies, or does a firm
provide a wide range of reasons to encourage talented people to join?
18) Retaining human capital Does the firm do relatively little to retain top talent or do whatever it takes to retain top talent
when they look likely to leave?
Note: This table is reproduced from Bloom and Van Reenen (2010)
11 For details see Li and Racine (2010).
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remain. We obtain estimates for β(zi) for each data point as
the z variable is observation specific. Confidence intervals
for the coefficients are obtained using a wild cluster boot-
strap (Hardle and Mammen 1993). We cluster at the firm
level as errors are probably correlated within panels. We
conduct our analysis using the np package (Hayfield and
Racine 2008) for R (R Development Core Team 2008).
6.2 B. Survey questions
Table 2 reproduces the original survey questions.
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